ABSTRACT ke examine the effects of market making and Intermittent trading on estimates of stock price volatility. When observed price changes are correctly tied to a stock's true price dynamics, it is found that nontradlng per se causes a loss of efficiency but no bias In traditional volatility estimates. Nontradlng Induces substantial Inefficiency In the extreme value estimator of volatility which It biases downward. Market making's effects add to the nontradlng-lnduced Inefficiency In the traditional estimator, while Information trading imparts a downward bias, and liquidity trading a potentially removable upward bias, In that estimator.
Introduction
Estimates of the volatility of stock prices or stock returns play an Important role In a number of areas of finance. These IncJude the pricing of financial claims whose payoffs are contingent on stock prices [e.g., Black and Scholes (1973) ], event studies, and variance-bounds tests of stock market rationality [e.g., LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shlller (1981) ]. In the most commonly used geometric Brownlan motion model of stock price dynamics, logarithmic price changes have a constant volatility, and the properties of both traditional and extreme value estimates of that volatility are well-known [e.g. Thorpe (1976) , Parkinson (1980) , Garman and Klass (1980) ]. In this paper, we discuss how these volatility estimates are affected by nontradlng and market making "noise" in observed stock prices. It Is shown that, in general, the efficiency of the estimates is considerably reduced and thus, for example, significance levels for tests of hypotheses in event studies can be mis-stated even when those levels appear to have been properly computed from observed prices .
We investigate the extent of inefficiency and bias in volatility estimates induced by nontradlng and market making. We show that, contrary to Gottlieb ana Kalay's (1983) conclusion, traditional volatility estimates are not biased by nontradlng per se . More importantly, however, nontradlng does cause a loss of efficiency In the traditional volatility estimator which we show can be severe for lower price stocks.
Market making has two effects on point estimates of volatility computed from observed prices. On the one hand, liquidity trading results in a tendency for observed prices to bounce between a market maker's bid and ask prices, and it is well known that this induces a potentially-removable upward bias in traditional volatility estimates [e.g. Working (1954) , Roll (1984) ].
-2-Unf ortunately , as we show, removal of the bias will often decrease, not Increase, estimation efficiency. On the other hand. Information-motivated trades with market makers tend to generate prices which will lead to a downward bias In traditional volatility estimates. In addition to causing these biases, we show that the Impact of Information trading and liquidity trading on observed prices exacerbates the loss of efficiency In traditional volatility estimators which is attributable to nontrading per se .
The efficiency of the extreme-value estimator of volatility, which Parkinson (1980) and Garman and Klass (1980) showed is substantially greater than that of the traditional estimator under "Ideal" conditions. Is more adversely affected by nontrading than is the traditional estimator. In addition, unlike the traditional estimator, it is downward biased by nontrading. As an example of the severity of nontrading's effects, our computations suggest that, in the best possible case, a stock must have a price of at least^30. 00 and a volatility of percentage price changes of 50% or more per annum before nontrading's effect on the efficiency of the extreme value estimator of volatility becomes insignificant enough for it to regain parity with the traditional estimator.
An Interesting feature of our analysis is the way in which nontrading-induced noise Is assumed to affect observed prices. Many models of nontrading assume that the stochastic process directing trades is Independent of stock price dynamics [e.g. Clark (1973) , Praetz (1972) , Blattberg and Gonedes (197A) , and Epps and Epps (1974) ]. In our paper, the stochastic process directing trades is tied down to the true stock price dynamics. This seems more appropriate if, in the presence of transaction costs, trading occurs only when stock prices move beyond predetermined stopping boundaries [e.g. Miller and Orr (1967) Miller and Orr (1967) and Magill and Constantinldes (1976 Figure 1 that the true stock price S(t") at time t" Is $2.50, and that a random draw of the true price from a lognormal (geometric Brownlan motion) distribution at t" + 6, defined to be S(t" + 6), equals $3.07. If we assume that stock prices must move by an eighth to trigger transactions, then the stock will not trade at t" + 6 because the true price Is not equal to an eighth multiple. Assuming that the stock trades at every eighth, the price observed at t" + 6 will be either $3.00 or $3-1/8, depending upon which of those two prices the last trade occurred at. Ihe probability distribution of the price of the last trade Is the probability distribution of the last passage of the price across one of the two "barriers" $3.00 or $3-1/8, conditional upon the true price being $2.50 at the beginning of the interval, t-, and $3.07 at the end of the interval, t^+ 6. if the continuous sample path of prices over the interval 6 happened to be the one labelled A in Figure 1 , the stock price observed at t^+ 6 would be $3.00. If, on the other hand, the stock price had followed path B, the price observed at t^+ 6 would be $ Gottlieb and Kalay (1985) . The reason Is that they Infer the effects of nontradlng on traditional volatility estimates from a distribution of observed closing prices which Is conditioned on a given beglnnlng-of-day (or equlvalently , end-of-prevlous-day) price. In terms of If the traditional volatility estimate Is computed using Gottlieb and Kalay 's approach with observed end-of-day prices generated by the tled-down Roll (1984) ].
The effects of market maker transactions with Information traders are more insidious. The market maker's ask (bid) will be hit by traders who have Inside
Information that the true price is higher (lower). It Is easy to see that. In absolute value, the true price change will be above the one registered In the trade with the market maker, and thus that the volatility of observed price changes will understate the volatility of true prices to the extent that the former are generated by market maker transactions with Informed traders.
There Is no obvious way to adjust for the downward bias. Miller and Orr (1967) and Maglll and Constantlnldes (1976) . We showed that such nontradlng, which Is obviously not Independent of a stock's price dynamics, does not bias the traditional estimator of volatility, but reduces its efficiency, and that It both biases and reduces the efficiency of the extreme value estimator. Second, we argued that If price observations are generated by market maker trades with information-motivated investors, then the traditional estimator of volatility will be biased downward as well.
Third, prices generated by market maker trades with liquidity-motivated individuals tend to impart an upward bias to volatility estimates, but that element of bias can be eliminated.
Our assessment of the effects of nontradlng and market making on volatility estimates are specific to the geometric Brownlan motion model which we employed, but our methodology holds generally for martingale models of prices in which variance rates per unit time increase as the length of the observation Interval increases. This robustness is important since our approach consists of deducing as many implications concerning volatility estimates as possible from the interaction between the salient features of market mlcrostructure and stock price dynamics, rather than simply injecting "noise" to account for these features. Plot of a hypothetical realized path of prices showing how the distribution of stock prices observed at the end of an interval can be determined endogenously from the stock price dynamics to which observed prices are subordinate. For illustrative purposes, it is assumed that the stock trades each and every time its price passes through an eighth multiple. Sbld<V*^= »-°°"
In Fig. 1(a) , a stock's observed price S^(t+')=$3.00 If there is no market maker a motion for its price followed path A over th conditional on a beginning-of-interval pric the geometric Brownian motion had followed would instead be Sg( to+*)=$3 . 125 In Fig. 1(b) , a market maker is assume price paths A and B each consist of bid and assumed constant one-eighth spread.
If the followed path A, the observed closing price the last transaction at time tg+S-h was a 53.00 if it was a market maker purchase. However, the parameters of some expressions for this minimum price movement would then have to be estimated simultaneously with the volatility parameter.
We investigate the efficiency of, and bias in, volatility estimates induced by nontradlng. Obviously other problems may be caused by intermlttence in observed prices. For example, the discontinuous sample path for observed prices could lead to an incorrect conclusion that transaction-to-transactlon prices are generated by jump processes [e.g., Oldfleld, Rogalski, and Jarrow (1977) ] when the "true" process has a continuous sample path.
Note that the estimation issues discussed here will not be avoided by computing stock price volatilities implied by option prices as long as these option prices and/or the prices of the underlying stocks are generated by (nonsynchronous) intermittent trades.
The analysis here can be followed mutatis mutandis If there Is a constant bid-ask spread, as Illustrated in Fig. 1(b) , where the spread is one-eighth. By analogy with Fig. 1(a) If the realized path of bid and ask prices Is that labelled A, the last trade will occur at the market maker's ask of^3.25 and/or the market maker's bid of^3.125; In the path labelled B, the last trade will occur at an ask price of $3,125 or a bid of^3.00. As before, the interval of nontrading will be the time between the last passage of the bid and ask prices through the eighth multiples and the end of Interval 6.
If the analysis in the text is followed literally, then there will always be a simultaneous sale to, or purchase from, the market maker at his or her bid and ask prices at the instant of their last passage through the eighth multiple. Provided that both simultaneous prices are reported, no problem would arise in distinguishing bid and ask prices.
So long as the bid-ask spread Is constant, volatility could be estimated from either the sequence of bid prices o£ the sequence of ask prices, and both sequences would follow a "tied down" stochastic process such as that described In the text.
Given the typical daily volatllies of stock price changes relative to their mean, this assumption is of trivial consequence.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the mean-squared-errors of volatility estimates computed from the simulations are "true" values, I.e., not sample estimates of the mean-squared-error of sample estimates of volatility. We verified that the five hundred replications did indeed yield a mean-squared-error for the noise-free geometric Brownlan motion which was equal to Its analytic asymptotic value.
if information traders are uncertain about the extent of their monopoly access to information, they will trade Immediately on the Information, and thereby reveal it to the market maker- Gammill (1985) shows that the market maker has an incentive to structure the market so this occurs. The market maker can only make an _ex post adjustment to take the information Into account, and thus expects to lose to the Information traders: in essence, the liquidity traders pay the market maker, who in turn pays the information traders to collect the Information.
We have assumed a constant bid-ask spread in our analysis. If the bid-ask spread is itself being estimated, it is hard to see how a model for the equilibrium behavior of that spread over time can be avoided. Crucial Ingredients would Involve specifications for Information and liquidity trading, and the technology for placing limit orders. For each level of volatility and Initial stock price, ratios are computed from 500 replications of a 250-day sequence of true stock price changes drawn from a geometric Brownlan motion process, and the Implied 250 day sequence of observed stock price changes drawn from the tied down Brownlan motion process.
•""The measure of relative efficiency Is defined, as usual, as the ratio of mean-squared-errors of the estimators.
The upward bias in the traditional estimator of the volatility of daily stock returns. Induced by market maker transactions with liquidity-motivated traders, is corrected here by adding twice the autocovarlance of those stock returns to that estimator.
